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Abstract: This article examines the politics of reconciliation in Indonesia and Southeast 
Asia. It focuses in particular on the case of Talangsari killings in Indonesia and makes a 
regional comparison with Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines and Myanmar. The 
Indonesian experience illustrates some of the complex issues that arise when attempts 
are made to dealing with past abuses, especially in the context of the constraints and 
possibilities faced by new democracies. In a comparative perspective what is being 
experienced in Indonesia is not new in the sense that, as argued by scholars elsewhere, 
new democracies also have to face this kind of situation. This article argues that dealing 
with the past human rights abuses brings about real power struggles among the 
contending actors and power holders and it reflects the power structures within and 
outside the country. It is suggested that there is no “universal” model for dealing with 
past human rights abuses but some form of accountability that brings together the 
elements of prosecution, reconciliation and forgiveness could be considered. 
Keywords: Talangsari killing, politics of reconciliation, human rights 
A. Introduction 
The public pressure to reinvestigate the Talangsari killings in post-Suharto 
Indonesia was a show case of the changing of balance of power during the Habibie 
and the Wahid presidencies (1998-2001) which led to pressures for the 
governments to deal with the Talangsari case through legal means and/or trials. 
However, the public pressure was not as great and this was due partly to the fact 
that there was little attention given to the case by the media and politicians from 
the Islamic political parties in the Parliament. There were a small number of 
human rights organizations like the Commission for Disappereances and Victims 
of Violence (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan, Kontras) and 
solidarity groups who brought the case to the attention of the public. Some 
representatives of the victims signed islah (peace) agreements with retired 
General Hendropriyono (until September 2004, he was the head of the powerful 
Bureau of National Intelligence, Badan Intelijen Nasional, BIA) at the end of 1998. 
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This created a division among the victims which later on made the efforts to find 
a mechanism for deal with the Talangsari case more difficult. 
The Talangsari killings occurred on 7 February 1986, in Talangsari village in 
Lampung province, Sumatera island. Prior to that day, the local government and 
military officers had been suspiciously monitoring the activities of a Talangsari-
based Islamic group led by a charismatic leader known as Warsidi.1 This led to the 
arrest of some members of the group. In response, Warsidi’s followers hijacked a 
car and attacked a police office nearby areas, making the authorities even more 
determined to crack down on this group. On the way to Talangsari village, the 
military officers clashed with Warsidi himself and his followers, causing the death 
of a number of people on both sides. The government responded by deploying 
military troops (led by then Colonel Hendropriyono) to arrest Warsidi and his 
followers. However, the situation in the field got out of control, more people were 
killed, injured and houses were set on fire during the clash. Accounts about the 
cause of the killings and the number of people who were killed or disappeared 
remain controversial: some put the death toll in the 30s while others put it at over 
200.2 The killings were followed by the arrest (and later trials) of the followers of 
Warsidi. The killings also brought condemnation of the Suharto government, 
especially for using the military to respond to civilians who used traditional 
weapons for self-defense purposes only. The person that remained the focus of 
attention was Hendropriyono. 
The Talangsari killings occurred in a political climate in which the Islamic 
community felt traumatised and victimised as a result of the arrests and trials of 
those who were involved in the case of Tanjung Priok killings (1984).3 It appeared 
that some of those who were killed in Talangsari village had left Jakarta and other 
places in Java, looking for refuge in this village. In a sense, as suggested in various 
accounts, these people looked for refuge (known as hijrah in Arabic) hoping to 
____________ 
1 For further discussion on the causes and consequences of the Talangsari killings, see Al Chaidar, 
Lampung Bersimbah Darah (Jakarta: Madani Press, 2000); Widjiono Wasis, Geger Talangsari (Jakarta: 
Balai Pustaka, 2001); and Abdul Syukur, Gerakan Usroh Di Indonesia, Peristiwa Lampung 1989 
(Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2003). 
2 Al Chaidar, pp 172-173 and Widjiono, pp 145-146 
3For the Tanjung Priok killings, see Priyambudi Sulistiyanto, “Politics of Justice and Reconciliation 
in post Suharto Indonesia”, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 37, 1, 2007, pp. 73-94. 
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establish a small community where they could practice Islamic teachings freely 
without government intervention.4 It must be stated here that there has been a 
long tradition of inter-island migration, especially from Java to Lampung. The 
majority of people who lived in  Talangsari village and the nearby areas were 
ethnic Javanese. Furthermore, the killings occurred in  a rural area in where many 
people working as peasants, village traders, village bureaucrats and also coffee 
plantation laborers. The combination of these various elements mentioned above 
also shaped the course of the events leading up to the killings. 
As mentioned earlier, public pressure to reinvestigate the human rights 
violations that happened during the New Order period increased after the fall of 
Suharto in May 1998, with the Talangsari killings being one case that received 
attention. As early as the middle of June 1998 the Committee for Moslem 
Solidarity (Komite Solidaritas Muslim, KSM) visited the National Commission on 
Human Rights, urging the investigation of the Talangsari killings and the Tanjung 
Priok killings and also demanding the release of the political prisoners who were 
implicated in these cases.5 At the same time, Kontras also sent its members to 
Talangsari village in Lampung province, aiming to get first-hand information 
about the case.6 As a result, Kontras came out with a list of persons who were 
killed and who disappeared. At the local level, there were organizations such at 
the Legal Aid Foundation-Lampung Branch (Lembaga Bantuan Hukum-
Lampung) and the Solidarity Committee of Lampung Students (Komite Solidaritas 
Mahasiswa Lampung, Smalam) who actively gathered data and information about 
the case especially given the focus on the possibility of bring the case to trial. In 
September 1998, other solidarity organisations coming from the areas 
surrounding Jakarta, the Tangerang-based Solidarity for Islamic Society 
(Solidaritas Masyrakart Islam Tangerang) and also the Bekasi-based 
Communication Forum for Young Muslim (Forum Komunikasi Generasi Muda 
Islam Bekasi) also visited the headquarters of the Indonesian Armed Forces and 
the Parliament urging the government to address past human rights abuses 
including the Talangsari case.7 
____________ 
4 Al Chaidar, p, 142 and Widjiono, p, 29. 
5 The leader of the Committee is Rachmat Basuki. “Komnas Diminta Usut Kasus Tanjungpriok 
and Lampung”, Kompas, 18 June 1998. 
6 “Bawa Soeharto ke Meja Hijau”, Merdeka, 2 September 1998. 
7 “Usut Tuntas Kasus Tanjungpriok, Lampung, dan Aceh”, Kompas, 2 September 1998. 
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At this stage, the public pressure mentioned above appeared as a direct 
reaction to the early initiatives carried out by Hendropriyono together with a 
number of former political prisoners, to establish an islah agreement. Some of 
these initiatives are as  follows.8 Some time around June 1998, there were a small 
number of former political prisoners who approached Hendropriyono (then 
Minister of Transmigration in the Habibie government), asking him to help with 
the release of those who were still imprisoned in the notorious Nusakambangan 
prison in Central Java.9 Hendropriyono reacted positively to the request and he 
wrote an official letter dated on 21 August 1998 asking President Habibie to speed 
up the release of other political prisoners from of the Talangsari case. He also 
lobbied the Attorney General AM Ghalib, the Minister of Justice, Muladi, the 
Minister of Defence, General Wiranto and the Chief Justice, Sarwata, for assistance. 
A month later, in September 1998, the Attorney General wrote an official letter to 
Habibie advising him to approve the request made by Hendropriyono. In October 
1998, the State Secretary Akbar Tanjung wrote letters to three ministers (the 
Coordinating Minister for Political Affairs, Faisal Tanjung, the Minister of Defence, 
General Wiranto and the Minister of Justice, Muladi) explaining the instructions 
given by the President to assist with the rehabilitation process for the remaining 
prisoners of the Talangsari case. Finally, at the end of December 1998, President 
Habibie issued a presidential decree (No.101/1999) granting clemency to fifteen 
prisoners. After the release from Nusakambangan prison, they came straight to 
Jakarta to meet Hendropriyono and other political prisoners and declared the 
signing of the islah agreement in Muhajirin Mosque inside the Ministry of 
Transmigration complex. In the welcoming speech, Hendropriyono said that 
these prisoners were jailed for political activities that were in differences with the 
government. He said: 
 
They were not criminals, thiefs and robbers. They were jailed because of 
politics and thus there was a misunderstanding with the government 
regarding policy.10 
____________ 
8 See, Widjiono, Geger Talangsari, especially chapter sixteen and seventeen. 
9 Ibid, p. 241. 
10 As quoted in Widjiono, p. 246. 
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At this occasion he promised that he would help with the release of other 
Islamic political prisoners jailed during the Suharto’s authoritarian period. 
Despite some representatives of the victims signing the islah agreement, the 
Talangsari case continued to attract public attention. Delegation after delegation 
visited the provincial parliament in the capital city of Bandar Lampung, each 
presenting their views on the case. Basically, the victims were divided almost 
equally between the supporters of the islah agreement and those who preferred 
a legal solution. The first camp received political support from the local parliament 
in Sukanda district (East Lampung) which issued an official statement dated 13 
December 2000, endorsing the non-legal solution through the islah agreement 
and at the same time urging the parties not to reopen the case for the sake of 
improving the welfare of the people in East Lampung district11 Meanwhile, the 
latter camp supported the organizations like Kontras, Smalam and the Legal Aid 
Foundation-Lampung branch, in arguing that the government should deal with 
this case through legal means. As in the case of Tanjung Priok, this took place at 
the time when the Parliament had just enacted the Law on Human Rights Court 
(no.29/2000), opening up the possibility of dealing with the Talasangsari killings 
through a special human rights court. 
2001 saw a slight increase in public gatherings organized by various parties 
from both sides, either in support of the islah agreement or of legal means. This 
time both sides lobbied the National Commission on Human Rights proposing 
their different views on the case. One idea that was proposed by the human rights 
organizations was to establish  a Commission to Investigate the Human Rights 
Violations in Talangsari (Komisi Penyelidikan Pelanggaran Hak Asasi Manusia 
untuk Talangsari, KPP Ham Talangsari). But both the government and the 
National Commission on Human Rights refused to do this. However, by mid-2001 
there was speculation that the National Commission was preparing a special team 
to investigate the Talangsari case, to be headed by Koesparmono Irsan, a former 
high-ranking police officer, although the details of tasks and of the members of the 
team remained unclear.12 Up to September 2001, the Indonesian public was still 
____________ 
11 Ibid, pp. 236-239. 
12 “Komnas HAM Setuju Usut Kasus Talangsari Lampung, Republika Online, 25 July 2001, 
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/2001/07/25/37538.shtm 
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wondering whether the team had done the necessary works needed to establish 
the KPP Ham Talangsari. On 6 September 2001 Kontras led a delegation including 
28 victims of the Talangsari case to the National Commission on Human Rights 
demanding the establishment of the KPP Ham Talangsari.13 In response, BN 
Marbun from the National Commission explained the difficulty of investigating 
the case because “certain parties had threated, pressured and imposed obstacles” 
to the National Commission not to go ahead with the investigation of the 
Talangsari case.14 
As the debates on this case continued, there are interesting political 
developments regarding to the Talangsari case that need attention here. First, 
there was division even among those who supported the islah agreement. The 
division was caused mainly by fighting over the distribution of material 
compensation given by Hendropriyono and also by personal rivalry.15 This gave 
the impression to the public that there were different motives for the parties 
signing the islah agreement. Second, in between October and November 2001, 
Kontras (on behalf of five organizations) and the representatives of some of the 
victims came to the Administrative Court in Jakarta to submit a legal action against 
the Megawati government for appointing Hendropriyono as the new head of the 
Bureau of National Intelligence.16 The legal base for this action was that the 
government ignored the principle of good governance (among others) by 
appointing him before his name was cleared of implicated in the Talangsari 
killings.17 These complex political developments have made the efforts to deal the 
Talangsari case through legal means even harder, due to the lack of consensus 
____________ 
13 “Komnas HAM Didesak Bentuk KPP HAM Kasus Lampung”, Republika Online, 7 September 
2001, http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/2001/09/07/43452.shtm 
14 “Komnas HAM Akui Ditekan dan Diancam”, Republika Online, 7 September 2001, 
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/online/2001/09/07/43559.shtm 
15 Refer to the rivalry between the Fauzi Isnan group and the Sudarsono group. See, Widjiono, 
Geger Talangsari, p. 230. 
16 Hendropriyono was appointed for the job in August 2001.“Korban Talangsari Lampung Gugat 
Presiden Megawati”, Republika Online, http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/2001/11/ 
10/51676.shtm 
17“Kontras Akan Gugat Hendropriyono”, Republika Online, http://www.republika.co.id/ 
berita/online/2001/10/23/48702.shtm; and “Pengangkatan Hendro sebagi Kepala BIN Digugat”, 
Republika Online, http://www.republika.co.id/berita/online/2001/11/09/51717.shtm 
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among the victims about how to resolve the case and, on top of that, the 
appointment of Hendropriyono to this powerful intelligence body.18 
Third, after one and a half years, the National Commission on Human Rights 
had failed to come up with concrete steps to deal with this case. This all, 
unfortunately, happened at the time when the National Commission underwent 
a change in leadership in 2002. Many unfinished matters (including the 
Talangsari case) had to be handed over from the chairmainship of Djoko 
Soegianto to that of Abdul Hakim Garuda Nusantara. This supported the 
accusations coming from some human rights organizations about the 
ineffectiveness of the National Commission to undertake such a big task.19 Up till 
now, despite the fact that the National Commission has promised to reinvestigate 
the case, it still has not decided on options that need to be adopted to deal with the 
Talangsari case.20 
In sum, following the fall of Suharto in 1998, public pressure to deal with the 
Talangsari killings in 1989 increased. The changing balance of power during the 
Habibie period and subsequently the Wahid period, created a division between 
those who opted to deal with the Talangsari case through an islah agreement and 
those who opposed the agreement in favor of legal means. Both sides have 
contested the issue ever since, which to a certain extent has contributed to the 
uncertainty about which mechanism that should properly be adopted to deal with 
the Talangsari case. Unfortunately, pressures from the human rights 
organizations had not moved the National Commission on Human Rights to 
establish a KPP Ham Talangsari, posing many questions about the commitment 
of the Commission to deal with the case and, more importantly, about whether 
Indonesia has the political will to resolve this case once and for all. 
B. Reflections from the Indonesian experience 
The Indonesian experience tells us that dealing with past abuses is a political 
process involving intense and constant political struggles among various parties. 
____________ 
18 “KPP HAM Trisakti Terhambat”, Republika Online, 11 January 2002, http://www.republika. 
co.id/berita/koran/2002/01/11/59869.shtm; and “PTUN Terima Intervensi Kepala BIN”, Republika 
Online, 1 February 2002, http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/2002/02/01/62857.shtm 
19 “Komnas HAM Diminta Tuntaskan Kasus Talangsari”, Republika Online, 5 February 2003, 
http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/2003/02/05/112998.shtm. 
20 Warga Talangsari Kembali Datangi Komnas HAM”, Kompas Online, http://www.kompas.com/ 
kompas- cetak/0302/05/nasional/114887.htm. 
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As shown earlier, in many of the past human rights abuses the former President 
Suharto and also other high-ranking military officers are implicated and this has 
created an atmosphere of both denial and anxiety among them. They have 
deliberately showed various forms and means of resisting and opposing any 
attempts to investigate or to prosecute the perpetrators of the past human rights 
abuses. This article offers the case of how post- Suharto Indonesian has begun to 
address the Talangsari killings of 1986. It has pointed out that public pressure to 
reinvestigate the case increased a great deal after the fall of Suharto in 1998. The 
changing balance of power during the Habibie and the Wahid presidencies 
opened up room for a coalition of the victims, human right organizations, 
politicians, and lawyers to put pressure on the government to deal with the 
Talangsari case through prosecution or trials. It has also shown that both secular 
and Islamic constituents in Indonesia were important forces behind this pressure, 
which is different from the East Timor case. As a result, the case has recently been 
brought to trial. The complexity of this story is, as it has been discussed earlier, 
that retired General Hendropriyono and some representatives of the victims 
signed islah (peace) agreements as a way to deal the case through a non-legal 
mechanism. 
What does the Talangsari killings case tell us? There are two main issues to 
raise here. First, the case study brings us back to the debates about the relative 
benefits of retributive justice and restorative justice in modern society. The first 
refers to a process through which justice can be achieved by prosecuting the 
perpetrators for their past crimes, the benefit being that this upholds the rule of 
law, and the dignity of the victims and it also breaks the cycle of impunity. The 
latter refers to a process through which all parties (perpetrators, victims and the 
community at large) are involved in enhancing the reconciliation process and in 
restoring moral order. Both processes have strengths and weaknesses. In this 
respect, the case of the Talangsari killings as it have unfolded thus far highlight the 
complexity of dealing with past human rights abuses in post-Suharto Indonesia. 
Second, critical analysis of the phenomenon of islah is needed. In other 
words, in debating about the merits and demerits of islah agreements many 
questions have been raised: Do islah agreements belong to the religious realm or 
the legal realm? Are they legally binding? Do they focus primarily on forgiving 
each other without public disclosure? Do they lead to ways to uncover the truth 
of the past? Whose truth: the perpetrators or the victims? The list of questions 
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could be extended. As this idea came from former high-ranking military officers, 
therefore the need to scrutinise the motives behind it is relevant. In other word, 
the role of islah agreements in enhancing or in obstructing the reconciliation 
process in post-Suharto Indonesia has yet to be critically examined. 
 
C. The Southeast Asian Comparison: Thailand,  Philippines, Cambodia 
and Burma 
Thailand: Silence about the past 
In Thailand two important events have been the subject of public attention: 
the 6 October 1976 massacre in Thammasat University and the killings that 
happened during the May 1992 uprising in Bangkok. The 6 October 1976 
massacre is an event that is still full of mystery, with many unanswered questions 
regarding how people were actually injured, killed, disappeared and how to bring 
about justice to the victims (many of them were students). Conflicting views 
emerged immediately about the circumstances that  led to the killings.21 
Thongchai Winichakul, a witness and a historian, argues that even until recently 
Thai society has remained ambivalent and silent about this event and he writes 
that “the memories of the massacre are still contested, unsettled and disturbing” 
and therefore it would take a long time for everyone including the Thai 
government to know the truth about this painful chapter of the past.22 No efforts 
are being made to reinvestigate the case as everyone including the victims and 
perpetrators have their own memories about this event. The complex nature of 
the political conflict and of the political players in Thailand at this point in time 
makes it difficult to find the truth. The 6 October 1976 massacre occurred during 
a brief democratic period (1973-1976), which was marked by intense power 
struggles between the political elites and the military. Students from Thammasat 
University had to pay dearly for their idealism and political activism as the politics 
of the Cold war and the rising of anti-communism sentiment worsened the 
____________ 
21 As suggested in Thongchai Winichakul, “Remembering/Silencing the Traumatic Past, the 
Ambivalent Memories of the October 1976 Massacre in Bangkok” in Shigeharu Tanabe and Charles F. 
Keyes (eds) Cultural Crisis and Social Memory, Modernity and Identity in Thailand and Laos (Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2002), pp. 243-283. 
22 P. 277. 
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divisions that were already present in Thailand.23 Meanwhile, the May 1992 
killings happened as a result of mass protests against the appointment of General 
Suchinda Kaprayoon as a new prime minister. This was a more a clear cut case.24 
Suchinda and his military cohorts had the power to give orders to shoot 
protesters in streets of Bangkok and therefore they can be categorized as the 
perpetrators. Of course, no one has brought to court because before he resigned, 
Suchinda declared an amnesty for himself and other military officers and 
therefore they could not be subject to future investigation.25 
The Thailand experience illustrates the difficulty of dealing with the past 
human rights abuses as the Thai society has been silent and ambivalent about the 
two past events. Finding the truth is still a long way off. Perhaps the 
commemoration activities occurred in 1996 to remember the 6 October 1976 
massacre, and perhaps this can be seen as the first step towards a long journey to 
uncover the truth about this event. Many obstacles remain as military leaders and 
political leaders may have reservations about reinvestigating this event because 
of the likelihood that it would rock the balance of power in Thailand and open up 
‘old’ wounds in Thai society. 
The Philippines: Forgiving the past 
There has been a tendency in the Phillippines to embrace what is known as 
‘forgiving the past’ as until today no one has been put on trial for committing 
human rights abuses. The fall of the Marcos regime opened up a political space 
and also paved the ways to the restoration of civil liberties.26 The then President 
____________ 
23 On the Thai student activism, see Elinor Bartak, The Student Movement in Thailand, 1970-1976, 
Working Paper 82 (Clayton, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, 1993). 
24 Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Imagery in the 1992 Nonviolent Uprising in Thailand” in Stephen 
Zunes, Lester 
R. Kurtz and Sarah Beth Asher (eds) Nonviolent Social Movements, A Geographical Perspective 
(Malden, Mass., USA and Oxford, UK, 1999), pp. 158-173. 
25 David Murray, Angels and Devils, Thai Politics from February 1991 to September 1992-A Struggle 
for Democracy? (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1996), pp. 175-176. 
26 For various views on this political transition, see See Benedict J. Kerkvliet and Resil B. Mojares 
(eds) From Marcos to Aquino, Local Perspectives on Political Transition in the Philippines (Manila: Ateneo 
de Manila University Press, 1991; and also David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and 
Change in the Philippines (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1991). 
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Corazon Aquino faced the mounting pressure from human rights organizations, 
church-based organizations, and also non- government organizations (NGOs) to 
deal with the human rights abuses that occurred during the Marcos era. Most of 
the abuses happened during the martial law period which lasted more than a 
decade (from 1972 to the early 1980s) and a range of people were affected, 
including students, workers, farmers, lawyers and civilian politicians.27 In the 
early days of Aquino’s presidency, there were efforts to bring about justice by 
putting military leaders on trial (including the trial of Benigno Aquino killers in 
August 1983). These had the support of the general public who had a strong 
conviction about the commitment of the Aquino government to prosecute the 
perpetrators of the past human rights abuses. 
However, as power struggles among political elites, the military and non-
state actors destabilised almost the entire period of Aquino’s presidency, the 
efforts to find strategies to deal with the past abuses lost momentum. No 
perpetrators were brought to court at this point. The election of Fidel Ramos, a 
former general who defected from Marcos during the heyday of the “people’s 
power” movement in 1986, made the likelihood of any serious attempt to bring 
justice to the victims of abuse and their relatives even more remote. It is debatable 
as to whether the powerful Catholic Church and its tradition of forgiving has 
influenced the capacity of Filipinos to forgive what has happened in the past. In a 
comparative sense, the democratisation processes that occurred during post- 
Marcos period was welcomed and monitored closely by the neighboring 
countries. However, the failure to deal with the past abuses in the Philippines tells 
the region that opening up the painful past is never easy because, as in the case of 
Thailand, it can threaten the balance of power. 
Cambodia: Struggles to deal with the past 
Cambodia has been through difficult stages in its national building efforts: 
the dismantling of colonial power, the experience of civil war, authoritarian 
regime, the effects of the Cold war, until recently, the establishment of democracy. 
Efforts to find strategies to deal with the past in Cambodia have been 
overshadowed by ongoing power struggles between domestic and international 
____________ 
27 Benedict Anderson, “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines” in The Spectre of Comparisons, 
Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World (London and New York: Verso, 1998), pp. 192-226. 
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political players.28 Until today only a few from the leadership of the Khmer Rouge 
regime (led by Pol Pot) been brought to court. It is estimated that about 1-2 million 
people died during the Khmer Rouge period (1975- 1979), regarded by some as 
a period of genocide in modern Cambodia history.29 
In 1997, both new Cambodian leaders Hun Sen and Prince Norodom 
Ranariddh asked the United Nations (UN) to assist Cambodia to establish a 
tribunal to try the Khmer Rouge leaders, similar to the ad hoc tribunals in the 
former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.30 The UN responded by forming a Group of 
Experts to prepare to establish a tribunal in Cambodia. The UN prepared a set of 
recommendations for an international tribunal in 1998, however Hun Sen 
changed his mind about the issues. He argued for upholding the principles of 
‘national sovereignty’, preferring to have a Cambodian court to try the Khmer 
Rouge leaders. At the international level, a few members of the Security Council 
also disagreed with the idea of establishing an international tribunal in Cambodia. 
Not many years earlier, even until in the early 1990s, the ‘big powers’ such as the 
US, China, and some European countries had formed an international coalition 
against Vietnam’s puppet government (led by Hun Sen) in Cambodia, and 
ironically the Khmer Rouge was part of the coalition. Consequently, the 
establishment of an international tribunal would uncover not only the truth about 
what happened during the Khmer Rouge period but also the role of the ‘big 
players’ in the international coalition that operated along the Thai- Cambodian 
border during the 1980s and the 1990s.31 
As the struggle continued, in 2001, the National Parliament and Senate 
passed the “Law on the Establishment of the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
____________ 
28 Debates on the nature of Cambodia’s democratic transition, see Sorpong Peou, Intervention 
and Change in Cambodia, Towards Democracy? (Bangkok and Singapore: Silkworm Books and Institute 
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000); and David W. Roberts, Political Transition in Cambodia 1991-99, 
Power, Elitism and Democracy (Richmond: Curzon Press, 2001). 
29 On the Khmer Rouge period, see Ben Kiernan, The Pol Pot Regime, 2nd edition, (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 2002) and David Chandler, Brother Number One, A Political Biography of 
Pol Pot (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999). 
30 Unless mentioned otherwise, the following accounts will be based from Nayan Chanda, 
“Cambodia: Unable to Confront the Past” in Yoichi Funabashi (ed) Reconciliation in the Asia-Pacific 
(Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pp. 111-132. 
31 Chanda, p. 116. 
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Courts of Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period 
of Democratic Kampuchea”. As stated in the law, a tribunal would be established 
in the Courts of Cambodia with participation from the international community.32  
However, the idea of having the majority of Cambodian judges in the proposed 
tribunal caused public criticism domestically and internationally. For this and 
other reasons, in early 2002, the UN  Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) withdrew its 
negotiation with the Cambodian government, creating uncertainty regarding the 
future of the tribunal.33 In addition, only a few judges have law degrees and most 
are yet to familiarize themselves with the international laws dealing with 
genocide and crimes against humanity.34 It must be noted here that the 
establishment of a tribunal in Cambodia with or without international support is 
crucial as a first step to deal with the human rights abuses that occurred during 
the Khmer  Rouge period. However, like other countries emerging from civil wars, 
Cambodia also has other urgent priorities in developing the economy, 
maintaining political stability and job creation. The efforts to find justice and 
reconciliation must go along with the above priorities.35 
Burma: Ignoring the past 
In the case of Myanmar, the event that is often brought to both domestic and 
international attention is the killings that occurred during the period of the 
democratic movement in 1988. Between the 8 August 1988 (known as “8-8-88”) 
and the 18 September 1988 when the Burmese military launched a coup, it is 
estimated that thousands students and civilians were killed and murdered in the 
streets of Rangoon and other cities throughout Burma.36 To this point, no public 
____________ 
32 Helen Jarvis, “Trials and Tribulations, The Latest Twists in the Long Quest for Justice for the 
Cambodian Genocide”, Critical Asian Studies, Vol. 34, Nop. 4, 2002, p. 609. 
33 Chanda, p. 123 and Jarvis, p. 610. 
34 Chanda, p. 119. 
35 As suggested in a report prepared by Center for Social Development, The Khmer Rouge and 
National Reconciliation-Opinions from the Cambodians (Phnom Penh: Center for Social Development, 
2001). 
36 On the origins of the 8 August 1988 Uprising, see Bertil Lintner, Outrage, Burma’s Struggle for 
Democracy (London and Bangkok: White Lotus, 1990) and on author’s own study, Priyambudi 
Sulistiyanto, Burma: The Politics of Uncertain Transition, 1988-1994, MA thesis (Adelaide: Flinders 
University, 1995). 
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inquiry has been established to investigate this event. Since the military generals 
(then SLORC and the State Peace and Development Council, SPDC, respevtively) 
which ordered the killings are still linked with powerful institutions, to deal with 
the past human rights abuses impossible. 
The difficulty might be the fear and anxiety of the military leaders 
surrounding the potential investigation of their human rights records. Burmese 
military leaders would likely work very hard to resist or oppose any attempts to 
investigate or to prosecute military personnel for their roles in the past human 
rights abuses. The Burmese military leaders may insist that the tatmadaw is a 
respected institution and the military officers are honorable people who have 
contributed much to the country. Prosecuting military officers could destroy their 
image and honor in the eyes of the people and therefore they may not hesitate to 
go to great lengths (a military coup or a military show of force, intimidation) in 
order to stop the investigations taking place. 
Currently Myanmar is facing multi-dimensional challenges, like improving 
the economic situation which has been in bad shape for a quite a while, 
maintaining political stability both in the centre and in the regions, improving 
public infrastructure, and upholding the rule of law. In other words, even in a 
democratic Myanmar the issues related to dealing with the past human rights 
abuses might not seem as urgent as other issues. In this kind of situation, the 
Myanmar democratic leaders may prefer a safe strategy which to address the 
urgent issues affecting the general population and avoid addressing the human 
rights issues that might endanger the balance of power in Burma. In addition, legal 
constraints are facing Myanmar. The judiciary in Myanmar is not an independent 
body like that in a democratic country. In Myanmar, and those who occupy top 
positions in the Supreme Court and the Attorney General were influenced by the 
military powerful circles.37 The existing Myanmar legal system would be limited 
in its ability to deal with the complexities of human rights cases and consequently 
it would need to be reformed by incorporating new legal instruments, 
conventions, and ideas available at the international level. The willingness of the 
Myanmar people themselves to deal with their own past is also important factor 
____________ 
37 Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar, Military in Charge” in John Funston (ed) Government and 
Politics in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001), pp. 227-228. 
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in this respect. It is acknowledged that the history of Myanmar is a history of 
repression, suffering, and conflict and consequently the people have suffered 
greatly.38 This has affected different sections of the society, from those in the cities 
to those who live in the hills and along the borders. In other words, everyone has 
shared a traumatic situation caused by the decades of political conflict and civil 
war. 
D. Conclution 
This article has examined the politics of reconciliation in post-Suharto 
Indonesia with a Southeast Asian regional comparison. As was suggested earlier, 
the difficulties experienced by Indonesian are not unusual as many new 
democracies have experienced similar situations. The three main strategies that 
have been adopted by new democracies are trials, amnesties, and truth 
commissions. Each of these strategies has its advantages and disadvantages. As 
was pointed out earlier, since the 1980s and 1990s truth commissions have been 
an increasingly popular mechanism for dealing with past abuses among new 
democracies. The appeal of a truth commission lies in the belief that it can 
strengthen the reconciliation process by giving an opportunity for both the 
victims and the perpetrators to exchange accounts of the past abuses in a series of 
public hearings. Indonesia is currently preparing to establish a truth and 
reconciliation commission to deal with the past human rights abuses.39 
However, considering the fact that Indonesia has established a mechanism 
for the prosecutiom of perpetrators through trials, and used it for the East Timor 
and the Tanjung Priok cases, it remains to be seen whether it restores a sense of 
justice to the victims. Perhaps we need to go beyond the political and legal world 
to find ways of dealing with the past. Here, it has been suggested that there are no 
“simple” solutions for Indonesia and Southeast Asia to deal with past human 
rights abuses. The Indonesian case and the experiences from the Southeast Asian 
region tell us that dealing with the past is a deeply political process involving 
____________ 
38 Christina Fink, Living Silence, Burma under Military Rule (Bangkok and London: White Lotus 
and Zed Books, 2001). 
39 Communication with Ifdhal Kasim, Executive Director, ELSAM (15/5/04); and also see “RUU 
KKR di Tengah Tarikan Kepentingan”, Kompas, 26 May 2004. 
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intense and constant political struggles among the elites and various parties 
within civil society. 
It is argued here that reconciliation is absolutely crucial and desperately 
needed. Reconciliation can be seen as a willingness on behalf of the victims not to 
seek revenge and a willingness to forgive the perpetrators unconditionally, even 
in a situation where the perpetrators remain stubborn or arrogant. Reconciliation 
is the victim’s prerogative and no one can act on his/her behalf, including the state 
or government. Reconciliation can complement forgiveness in the sense that it 
helps to heal the unfinished business in the past and to move things forward in 
terms of building a new kind of human relationship. As in Minow’s words 
(2001:14) ‘the act of forgiving can reconnect the offender and the victims and 
establish or renew a relationship’.40 It is hard but not unachievable, nonetheless. 
Support for forgiveness can be drawn from religious traditions and cultural and 
secular sources. In Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Burma 
there are similar traditional celebrations each year which focus on forgiving each 
other’s mistakes. For instance, in Indonesia there is idul fitri at the end of 
Ramadhan (for Muslims), there are the Easter celebrations (for Christians), loy 
kratong for Thai Buddhists. or on New Year day. A Burmese scholar has proposed 
that the water festival thingyan that happens annually in the month of April could 
be used as focal point for a ceremony of national reconciliation in Burma.41 
Cambodia also has its own version of this “water festival”. I believe that there are 
many forms of the locally-based reconcilitiaton and forgiveness ceremonies 
practiced throughout the Southeast Asian region, and that within these traditions 
lies a great deal of potential for encouraging reconciliation and forgiveness among 





40 Minow, Between Vengeance and Forgiveness: Facing History after Genocide and Mass Violence 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1998), p. 14. 
41 Kanbawza Win, Impunity Inconceivable, Working Paper, 01/02 (Washington D.C.: Technical 
Advisory Network Burma, 2002), pp. 18-19. 
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